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Parental Liability for a Child's
Tortious Acts
I. The Parent-Child Relationship
The parent-child relationship has been historically subjected to ex-
tensive and close scrutiny by the American judicial system and by legal
scholars.' The duties the law places on a parent are among the most
demanding it places on any individual. Parenthood is a twenty-four
hour-a-day task that embraces such far-reaching concepts as love, protec-
tion and support.2 Realistically, the duty to love is too abstract an idea to
find much applicability in the courts. The more visible manifestations of
that love, the protection and support of the child, however, are well-
defined cornerstones of the parent-child relationship.
3
Naturally there are limits to the broad duties placed upon the parent.
When the child is the aggressor in a tortious situation, the parent is not
automatically deemed liable as an insurer of the child's behavior. 4 The
question becomes under what circumstances will the parent be judged
liable for the child's act. This comment seeks to answer that question by
carefully examining the current law. The considerations of parental
supervision, infant capacity, parent-child immunity, and damages incur-
red by an injured child are discussed as each operates within the
framework of the parent-child relationship. For the sake of comparison,
the situation is considered in which the child is the victim of the offense.
It is argued that the liability of parents for their children's tortious acts
should be expanded beyond its present limitations.
1. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ. THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 831 (1965); Coburn,
Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599
(1969); Note, Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights in South Dakota, 16 S.D. L.
REV. 203 (1971); Note, Stanley v. Illinois: Expanding the Rights of the Unwed Father, 34 U.
Pir-r. L  REV. 303 (1972); 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 785 (1970).
2. Appeal of Diane B., 456 Pa. 429, 321 A.2d 618 (1974).
3. The duty to protect the child is a vital one. It is a primary responsibility of the
parent to see that the child's behavior will not place him in a situation that could prove
dangerous. Driscoll v. C. Rasmussen Corp., 35 I11. 2d 74, 219 N.E.2d 483 (1966); Styer v.
City of Reading, 360 Pa. 212, 61 A.2d 382 (1948).
4. Assurance Co. of America v. Bell, 108 Ga. App. 766, 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963). Here,
the defendant insurance company refused to indemnify the plaintiff for losses sustained
when the plaintiff's three-year-old son released the emergency brake on a car owned by a
friend of the plaintiff's wife. The court overruled the defendant's demurrer saying, "But the
parent is not an insurer that the child will not harm another." Id. at 774, 134 S.E.2d at 545.
II. The Capacity of the Child
Before a victim can recover for an injury received at the hands of a
child, he must prove that the child had the capacity to commit the tort.
The best approach to understanding the legal treatment of a child's
capacity is to divide the discussion of the topic into two categories,
intentional and negligent torts.
A. Intentional Torts
One of the leading cases in the examination of a child's capacity to
form a tortious intent is Garratt v. Dailey.5 Five-year-old Brian Dailey
allegedly pulled a lawn chair out from under Ruth Garratt, an adult
neighbor's sister. When she brought an action against Brian for battery,
an intentional tort, the Washington Supreme Court was confronted with
the problem of what mental state must be shown in a five-year-old to hold
him responsible for an intentional tort. The test they devised is simply
that if the child knew to a substantial certainty the nature of his act, he
will have formed the requisite intent. Brian had only to know to a
substantial certainty that if he moved the chair, Mrs. Garratt would fall. 6
Clearly, the Garratt court was concerned only with the child's under-
standing of the physical nature of the act and not of all its possible
ramifications. Nothing was said to indicate that Brian must have under-
stood that Mrs. Garratt would suffer dire consequences because of his act.
The child's appreciation of the wrongfulness of his act is generally
not considered when he is alleged to have committed an intentional tort.
In Ellis v. D'Angelo7 a four-year-old boy was held capable of committing
a battery upon the babysitter he had violently attacked and injured. This
case asserts that while a child need understand only the physical nature of
his act and not all its possible consequences, the wrongfulness of the act
still may be an important consideration. Ellis indicated that a showing
that the child understood the wrongfulness of his act would entitle the
plaintiff to exemplary damages. Proof of a specific wrongful intent on the
part of the child may also be a necessary element of the alleged offense,
as in the case of malicious assault. 8
5. 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955). In Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 Ill. App. 2d
350, 195 N.E.2d 422 (1963), a nine-year-old girl was struck by a stone thrown by a
six-year-old boy and suffered a loss of sight in one eye. The complaint was dismissed by the
trial court for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
the count alleging negligence because the boy was too young. It reversed on the count
alleging assault, however, because that was considered an intentional tort. Citing the
Garratt "substantial certainty" test, the court recognized that a child too young to be
negligent "may have the capacity to intend an injurious act." Id. at 354, 195 N.E.2d at 425.
6. The court in Garratt wrote, "A battery would be established if, in addition to
plaintiff's fall, it was proved that, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial
certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been." 46 Wash.
2d at 202, 279 P.2d at 1094.
7. 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
8. Walker v. Kelly, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 715, 314 A.2d 785 (1973).
B. Negligent Torts
Although the plaintiff is burdened to prove the child knew the nature
of his act, intentional torts are generally more easily proved against a
child than are negligent acts. 9 Several reasons exist for the greater
difficulty an injured party experiences in trying to prove a defendant child
was capable of negligence. The first of these is the troublesome standard
of care. The wide divergence of competence among children of different
ages and even within the same age group requires a standard more
flexible than the "reasonable man" standard. The civil courts borrowed
presumptions used by the criminal courts to achieve some uniformity.
The presumptions are threefold. First, a child under seven years of
age is presumed incapable of negligence. Second, from age seven to
fourteen the presumption of incapacity becomes easier to rebut as the
child grows older. Last, at age fourteen, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that the child is capable of negligence. 10 These presumptions are a
starting point but the child's conduct in any particular case still must be
examined and evaluated. The best and most common approach to this
task is that followed in the Pennsylvania case of Kuhns v. Brugger. " In
Kuhns, a twelve-year-old accidentally shot his cousin while they were
staying at their grandfather's vacation cottage. Quoting a prior case,12 the
court stated, "The standard by which actions of children are to be
measured is the child's capacity to appreciate the danger involved. This
capacity is usually determined by the understanding expected from chil-
dren of like age, intelligence and experience."' 3 Although this is obvi-
ously a subjective standard, it is more effective than an objective standard
could possibly be when utilized to judge such a non-uniformly developed
group as children. The adaptability of this subjective standard to the case
at hand accounts for its widespread acceptance. 14
There is one occasion when the courts will hold a child to the
objective standard of a "reasonable man": When the child is engaged in
an adult activity. The court in Dellwo v. Pearson5 did so in holding a
twelve-year-old boy responsible for negligently driving a motorboat.
They wrote, "[M]inors are entitled to be judged by standards commensu-
rate with age, experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities ap-
propriate to their age, experience, and wisdom .. ." 16 The chief
problem arises in determining what constitutes an adult activity.17
9. See Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 III. App. 2d 350, 195 N.E.2d 422 (1963).
10. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 155-56 (4th ed. 1971).
I1. 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957).
12. Koenig v. Flaherty, 383 Pa. 187, 117 A.2d 719 (1955).
13. 390 Pa. at 341, 135 A.2d at 401 (citation omitted).
14. See, e.g., Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960); Audet v.
Convery, 55 Del. 336, 187 A.2d 412 (1963).
15. 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
16. Id. at 458, 107 N.W.2d at 863.
17. In Purtle v. Shelton, 251 Ark. 519, 474 S.W.2d 123 (1971), a seventeen-year-old
boy accidentally shot his friend while deer hunting. The court held him to a subjective rather
In addition to the subjective standard, the child, like everyone else,
is also benefitted by the greater number of defenses available in negli-
gence actions as opposed to suits for intentional torts. Thus, in many
states, the plaintiff's contributory negligence will excuse a negligent child
for the harm he causes.' 8 Conversely, in cases in which the child is the
victim of negligence, he may by virtue of his age be incapable of
contributory negligence that the adult defendant could use as a defense.
The age at which a child may be insulated by this incapacity varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 19
In summary, the capacity of a child is a vital consideration whenever
liability is in issue. Although the courts have attempted to formulate
guidelines that will create uniformity, the area is still subject to a great
deal of individual interpretation. This must be remembered when discus-
sing the child as either actor or victim in a tort situtation.
III. Parental Liability for the Child as Actor
A. The Child's Intentional and Negligent Torts
1. General Rule: Parental Non-Liability. -The victim of a child's
tort is usually left without recompense since children are normally judg-
ment-proof. The French Civil Code remedied this situation by holding the
parent vicariously liable unless he could establish that the injurious act
was unpreventable. The concept was adopted in Louisiana and intensified
by eliminating the parent's chance of avoiding liability.2" Thus, the
Louisiana parent is strictly and vicariously liable for the torts of his
child.21
At common law, however, the evolution of parental liability was
quite dissimilar. There was no parental liability for a child's tort unless
the parent participated to some degree in the harmful act.22 Unlike
the civil-law approach, liability could not be predicated solely on the
relationship between parent and child.23 Nor would the negligence of the
child be imputed to the parent. A leading case in this area arose when a
father left his golf club lying on the lawn. His young son, while playing
than the "reasonable man" standard. The rationale was that deer hunting could not be
characterized by the courts as an adult activity and that such a determination must be made
by the legislature. The case is given detailed discussion in Note, Torts-The Standard of
Care Required of a Minor Using Dangerous Instrumentalities, 26 ARK. L. REV. 243 (1972).
18. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 130, at 101 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Red Top Cab Co. v. Cochran, 100 Ga. App. 707, 112 S.E.2d 229 (1959)
(six); Romine v. City of Watseka, 34 II1. App. 370, 91 N.E.2d 76 (1950) (seven); Meineke v.
Hollowell, 136 Ind. App. 324, 200 N.E.2d 541 (1964) (five); Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444,
190 A.2d 773 (1963) (four).
20. Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 974, 1025 (1973).
21. Scott v. Behrman, 273 So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
22. See Bonner v. Surman, 215 Ark. 301, 220 S.W.2d 431 (1949); LaBonte v. Federal
Mut. Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 252, 268 A.2d 663 (1970).
23. Rovin v. Connelly, 291 A.2d 291 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); National Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. Freschi, 393 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d
51 (1944).
with the club, accidentally injured a playmate. An action for damages
was brought against the father and the child. The court held that since a
golf club was not so intrinsically dangerous as to be a "dangerous
instrumentality," the father was not negligent and the case against him
should be dismissed. 24 As a result of these barriers existing at common
law, many individuals were left uncompensated for injuries caused by
children. To provide deserving plaintiffs with some form of redress, the
courts began to carve out exceptions whereby the parent could be held
liable for his child's tort. Eventually four of these exceptions were
accepted into general use. 25 Three are discussed in the following.section.
The fourth, which focuses directly on the parent's own tortious conduct in
the form of negligent supervision, will be considered at a later point.
26
2. Exceptions to the Non-Liability Rule .- The first exception con-
cerns entrusting a child with a dangerous instrumentality. This raises an
initial question of what is a dangerous instrumentality. Unfortunately
there is no definitive answer, as the determination often depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case, including the child's age, judgment,
and experience. 27 The court's determination frequently appears to be
randomly arrived at and based upon its own predilections. 28 The predom-
inant pattern of the dangerous instrumentality cases is that it is rare that
24. Lubitz v. Wells, 19 Conn. Supp. 322, 113 A.2d 147 (Super. Ct. 1955).
25. In Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955), the eight-year-old daughter of
hotel guests slammed a door on the hand of a hotel employee, severing one of his fingers.
The court outlined the four exceptions and illustrated them with other cases before holding
that the plaintiff did not state a cause of action against the parents. The court wrote,
However, there are certain broadly defined exceptions wherein a parent may
incur liability: 1. Where he intrusts his child with an instrumentality which,
because of the lack of age, judgment, or experience of the child, may become a
source of danger to others. 2. Where a child, in the commission of a tortious act, is
occupying the relationship of a servant or agent of its parents. 3. Where the parent
knows of his child's wrongdoing and consents to it, directs or sanctions it. 4.
Where he fails to exercise parental control over his minor child, although he
knows or in the exercise of due care should have known that injury to another is a
probable consequence.
Id. at 703.
26. See notes 60-73 and accompanying text infra. The fourth exception listed in
Gissen predicated parental liability upon a failure to control the child. This is a comparative-
ly large topic that is interwoven throughout the other three exceptions as well. At this point
it will be most fruitful to hold discussion of parental supervision in abeyance.
27. Some objects, such as rifles, are so intrinsically dangerous that there can be little
dispute that they are dangerous instrumentalities. Giguere v. Rosselot, 110 Vt. 173, 3 A.2d
538 (1939). Others, such as matches, become dangerous instrumentalities only in particular
situations. Jarboe v. Edwards, 26 Conn. Supp. 350, 223 A.2d 402 (Super. Ct. 1966).
28. The air rifle or BB gun is illustrative of this point. For example, in 1960 a
Mississippi case concluded that it was a dangerous instrumentality. Tatum v. Lance, 238
Miss. 156, 117 So. 2d 795 (1960). Just a year earlier in Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111
S.E.2d 598 (1959), an air rifle was judged not- to be a dangerous instrumentality per se. The
two-year age difference between the actors did not appear to be a significant distinction. An
air rifle was even held to be a "toy" in a case in which the court found no parental duty to
warn the eight-year-old who used it of its hazards. Thus in Highsaw v. Creech, 17 Tenn.
App. 573, 69 S.W.2d 249 (1933), there was no recovery for the young playmate who lost his
eye to a shot from the "toy." Although this case was decided forty years ago, it still appears
to be the law in Tennessee. See Saunders v. State, 208 Tenn. 347, 345 S.W.2d 899 (1961).
Citing Highsaw, the court in Saunders stated, "of course, air rifles are classed as toys and
are bought for small boys." 208 Tenn. at 370, 345 S.W.2d at 909.
a parent is automatically ruled liable. The courts tend to look for improper
action on the parent's part, usually inadequate supervision, before declar-
ing him liable.29 This is virtually a requirement of parental participation
in the offense through an error of omission or some other parental
misconduct.
The second exception, turning on principles of agency, requires an
even more overt element of parental participation. The cases employing
this exception are very straightforward. In one instance a father told his
son to kill trespassing dogs that were decimating their turkey flock. When
the son unjustifiably shot the plaintiff's foxhound, the father was judged
responsible on the theory of agency. 30 On the other hand, another parent
was not liable when her son, who was told to sprinkle the grass, turned
the hose on a horse, which stampeded causing great damage. Here, the
injurious act was outside the scope of the son's employment.3 '
Perhaps the most frequent use of this exception is provided by the
"family purpose doctrine," which was spawned by a fictional agency
relationship within the family. 32 The doctrine requires the responsible
person to be the head of the household33 and to have given his consent,
either expressly or impliedly, to the driver of the vehicle who has caused
the injury.34 Furthermore, the car must be available for general use, not
merely on a particular occasion. 35 Some courts dispute the agency theory
and view the family purpose doctrine solely as the result of public policy
demands. 36 Of course, the owner of the vehicle is not always held liable
for the injury if, for example, the minor's use of the car substantially
departs from that which is authorized. Thus, when the owner permits his
car to be driven to a nearby dance, he is not responsible for damage done
on an out-of-state joyride. 37 While the family purpose doctrine is not
29. In Jarboe v. Edwards, 26 Conn. Supp. 350, 233 A.2d 402 (Super. Ct. 1966), the
defendant's four-year-old son was permitted access to matches, which he used to start a
fire in a young friend's trousers. Emphasizing the child's known fascination with fire and
the lack of proper parental supervision, the court found liability. Clearly the two factors that
the court stressed were vital to the plaintiff's success and the dangerous instrumentality
exception merely served as a convenient rationale for the decision. Conversely, in White v.
Page, 61 Ohio Abs. 498, 105 N.E.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1950), the court found neither of the
above factors and held that a bow and arrow with which an eleven-year-old inflicted injury
was simply not a dangerous instrumentality.
30. Harrington v. Hall, 22 Del. 72, 63 A. 875 (Super. Ct. 1906).
31. Evers v. Krouse, 70 N.J.L. 653, 58 A.181 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904).
32. Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 694, 201 S.E.2d 1 (1973).
33. Lee v. Degler, 169 Colo. 226, 454 P.2d 937 (1969).
34. Gotcher v. Rowell, 2 Wash. App. 615, 468 P.2d 1004 (1970).
35. Costanzo v. Sturgill, 145 Conn. 92, 139 A.2d 51 (1958).
36. In Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969), the court stated,
[The] doctrine is not based on the common law rules of agency as generally
understood and applied, but is rather a legal fiction utilized as an instrument of
public policy in imposing vicarious liability on those whom the courts think should
bear the responsibility for negligence committed by a member of the family.
Id. at 1178. The valuable lesson contained in the Peterson case is not its criticism of the
doctrine's agency origins but rather its recognition of policy that favors placing the loss
where it can be fairly borne.
37. In Cross v. Whitley, 319 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D.N.C. 1967), the court, applying North
universally followed,38 there is a recognizable trend to broaden its
scope. 39 This is one area in which courts have discovered that sound
public policy has demanded expansion of parental liability.
The third exception to the general non-liability rule occurs when the
parent approves the act by direction, consent or ratification. In one Texas
case, the plaintiff recovered sixty dollars from the father of the boys who
killed his hog. The court decided that the father had counselled and
abetted his sons in the act and was therefore responsible.' A North
Carolina court did not find the same liability in a case in which a
fifteen-year-old took indecent liberties with his date. Although the father
had instructed his son to engage in illicit sexual intercourse, he did not
encourage the type of assault complained of and could not be held
responsible.
41
Consent differs from direction in that it may be tacit. An illustration
of this facet of the exception occurred in the case of Langford v. Shu.
42
Here, the mother of a twelve-year-old boy stood silently by while he
played a practical joke on a neighbor woman with a known fear of exotic
animals. When the boy sprang a foxtail at her, she thought it was alive
and her resulting flight culminated in a serious fall. The court found
potential parental liability, declaring that the parent's failure to restrain
the child could amount to consent to his act. The parental consent that
produced the potential liability in the Langford case closely parallels the
parental participation that is often an important factor in the dangerous
instrumentality cases.
4 3
Ratification differs from the previous examples in that it occurs after
the act in question has taken place.' This aspect of the exception was
mentioned in the 1930 case of Ryley v. Lafferty."5 Here, a sixteen-year-
old habitually tricked younger children into accompanying him to a
secluded spot where he would beat them up. The court found that one
young victim had stated a cause of action against the bully's parents. The
Ryley case not only exemplifies ratification but also reinforces the notion
Carolina law, held that the family purpose doctrine was not applicable against the owner of
the automobile when the driver exceeded his authorized use of the vehicle.
38. See, e.g., Williams v. Wheeler, 252 Md. 75, 249 A.2d 104 (1969); Grimes v.
Labreck, 108 N.H. 26, 226 A.2d 787 (1967); Huskey v. Williams, 360 Pa. 78, 60 A.2d 32
(1948).
39. Note, The Child Driver Under the Kentucky Family Purpose Doctrine, 55 Ky. L.J.
502 (1967). "The very nature of the family purpose doctrine will lead the [Kentucky] Court
[of Appeals] to broaden its scope and thereby extend relief to a greater number of injured
litigants." !d. at 512.
40. Trahan v. Smith, 239 S.W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
41. Bowen v. Mewborn, 218 N.C. 423, 11 S.E.2d 372 (1940).
42. 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962).
43. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
44. "The primary meaning of the word 'ratify' is to confirm; and in its clearest
connotation it means to confirm or approve of something which has already been said or
done." 75 C.J.S. Ratify at 609 (1952).
45. 45 F.2d 641 (D. Idaho 1930).
that some form of parental participation, even of a passive variety, is
needed before the courts will affix liability.' This demonstrates that in
actuality these exceptions have not made much of a dent in the common-
law requirement of parental participation in the tortious act.
3. The Vandalism Statutes .- Although the courts have not moved
far from the common law in affixing parental liability, the state legisla-
tures have made an attempt to do so through enactment of vandalism
statutes. This has been a concerted effort to expand parental liability on a
limited basis as forty-six states have enacted laws that seek to find a
source of recompense for a child's offense. 47 The one passed by the
Pennsylvania legislature is typical:
4 8
Any parent whose child under the age of eighteen years is
found liable or is adjudged guilty by a court of competent
jurisdiction of a wilful, tortious act resulting in injury to the
person, or theft, destruction or loss of property of another,
shall be liable to the person who suffers the injury, theft,
destruction or loss to the extent hereinafter set forth.
Of course there are variations in approach among the states.' 9 Yet,
regardless of the type of statute a legislature enacts, the purpose behind
vandalism statutes appears to be uniform throughout the country. That
purpose is to place upon the parent the obligation to control his minor
child and to prevent the child from intentionally harming others.5 ° Since
any law in derogation of the common law is construed strictly, however,
these vandalism statutes are far from a bonanza for the injured party. 51
46. To make this point the court wrote,
Having full knowledge of their child's habits, traits, and vicious disposition, and
encouraging him in the manner charged to continue such acts, would constitute
assent and participation on the part of the parents in the tort alleged, and, if so, it
would be regarded as negligence upon the parents' part.
Id. at 642.
47. Comment, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1037 (1970).
48. PA. STAI. ANN. tit. I1, § 2202 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
49. The Georgia legislature enacted a vandalism statute in 1956. Later the Georgia
Supreme Court held that since it contained the word "vandalism," the act did not pertain to
personal injuries. Vort v. Westbrook, 221 Ga. 39, 142 S.E.2d 813 (1965). The legislature
quickly amended the act, deleting the word "vandalism" and extending coverage to person-
al injuries. They also extended liability to persons in loco parentis as pointed out in Corley
v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971). For a discussion of the unfortunate
subsequent history of the amended act, see notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra.
Another state's approach may be seen in a New Mexico plaintiff's attempt to seek
recovery for the loss of his teeth and expensive orthodonture. The court in Ross v. Souter,
81 N.M. 181, 464 P.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1970), decided this was not property under the statute,
and recovery was denied. A narrow approach favored by a legislature is evidenced by New
Jersey's vandalism statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 53A-15 (Supp. 1977). The only change it
makes from the common law is to dispense with the requirement that the parent be aware of
the need to control his child. Note, The New Jersey Parental Liability Statute, 39 TEMP. L.Q.
177, 183 (1966). Nevertheless, in many cases this narrow alteration could be determinative
of whether the plaintiff ultimately recovers.
50. Town of Groton v. Medbery, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 671, 301 A.2d 270 (1972).
51. In McKinney v. Caball, 40 Mich. App. 389, 198 N.W.2d 713 (1972), a seventeen-
year-old girl went for an unauthorized joyride in the plaintiff's car. She had an accident that
caused considerable damage to the car. The plaintiff was denied recovery since she could
not affirmatively prove the damage was caused by willful or malicious property destruction
as required by the vandalism statute.
Another limiting factor the plaintiff faces is that vandalism statutes are
usually limited to minimal recoveries in the approximate range of three
hundred dollars.5 2 This feature encourages increased parental supervision
to some degree but the minimal amounts recovered by the plaintiff
prevents the parent from ever becoming his child's insurer. Despite these
limitations, it should be remembered that the dollar limitations can
multiply in cases in which several children are responsible for the
damage. 
5 3
The constitutionality of these statutes has been attacked in five
states. These challenges rested heavily on alleged violations of the equal
protection and due process clauses of the United States Constitution.
54
Only once was the statute struck down as unconstitutional. This occurred
in the Georgia case of Corley v. Lewless.55 Here, a shopkeeper told her
young son to ask a twelve-year-old boy not to ride his bicycle so close to
the shop window because an accident might happen. A fight ensued and
her son was badly injured. His father brought action against the twelve-
year-old, his mother and the uncle with whom they both lived. The de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment was denied and the ruling was
certified for direct appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court decided that the
due process clause was violated because liability was automatically
placed upon the parent or one in loco parentis without regard for any
mitigating circumstances. The court distinguished the three unsuccessful
challenges on the ground that each of the other states placed dollar limits
on liability. Since Georgia's statute imposed no limit, the court viewed it
as compensatory in nature rather than penal. Thus, in the court's opinion,
the statute created tort liability that otherwise would not exist, merely
because of the parent-child relationship. The Georgia legislature has since
52. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 871 (4th ed. 1971).
53. See Lewis v. Martin, 16 Ohio Misc. 18, 240 N.E.2d 913 (C.P. Clermont 1968). In
Lewis, since four of the parent's children were involved, the potential liability was in-
creased from the statutory maximum of $250 to $1,000.
54. In Kelly v. Williams 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Texas statute, relying heavily on the reasonableness of the enact-
ment. It quoted Comment, Parent and Child-Civil Responsibility of Parents for the Torts of
Children-Statutory Imposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529, 530 (1958), saying,
"[I]t is better that the parents of these young tortfeasors be required to compensate those
who are damaged, even though the parents be without fault, rather than to let the loss fall
upon the innocent victims." 346 S.W.2d at 438. Texas, using a rationale similar to that
supporting the inroads made by the family purpose doctrine, is clearly ratifying what it
perceives to be the fairer course of action-making the parent, regardless of his participa-
tion, insurer of his child up to the statute's limit.
In General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963), the
North Carolina court upheld the state vandalism statute simply as within the police power of
the state. This case has received further notation: Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 601 (1966). The third
attack failed when the Supreme Court of Wyoming synthesized Kelly and Faulkner to
support its conclusion in Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967).
Referring to the previous two out-of-state decisions, the court said, "In the light of such
holdings and being furnished no persuasive authority to the contrary, we cannot here
determine the statute before us to be clearly unconstitutional on the grounds charged." Id.
at 444.
55. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
removed the court's primary objection by placing a five hundred dollar
liability limit in the act.
56
The only constitutional attack on a state's vandalism statute subse-
quent to the decision in Corley took place in Maryland in In re Sorrell.57
Two juvenile brothers took part in assaulting another child. The trial
judge ordered their parents to make restitution in the amount of two
thousand dollars to the parents of the injured boy.5" On appeal, one basis
of attack was that the statute violated due process protection. The Mary-
land court, after reviewing the previous four attacks upon vandalism
statutes, upheld the constitutionality of the one in its state, viewing the
vandalism statute as within the police power. Further, the court pointed
out that liability without fault, as charged in the instant case, was not
novel to the law. The Corley decision was distinguished because Geor-
gia's vandalism statute had placed no limit on liability.
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B. Negligent Supervision by the Parent
The fourth exception through which a parent may be judged liable
for the tort of his child is the parent's negligent supervision of his child.'
This exception differs from the previous three in that it does not require
parental participation in the child's offending act. The focal point is
instead the parent's own actions in supervising his child. The Restatement
of Torts helps explain exactly what constitutes negligent supervision:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control
his minor child so as to prevent it from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control. 6
The initial requirement, the ability to control the child, is one that the
courts are able to decide comparatively easily on the facts of a given case.
Obviously, the younger the child, the more effectively the parent will be
able to control him and the more he will need that control. 62 Naturally
there are a few fine distinctions the courts may have to make. For
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1976).
57. 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d 110 (1974).
58. This amount was double the $1,000 limit set out in the statute because the parents
had two children implicated in the assault. Id. at 183, 315 A.2d at 113.
59. The court did not find Corley's reasoning sound but chose easily to distinguish it
rather than dispute it. They remarked, "Even acceptance of the inference suggested by
Corley, that limitations upon the amount of vicarious parental liability would affect the
constitutionality of a legislative right to impose it, the appellants here are not aided." Id. at
187, 315 A.2d at 115.
60. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1966).
62. Jarboe v. Edwards, 26 Conn. Supp. 350, 223 A.2d 402 (Super. Ct. 1966).
"[T]he modern view holds that the very youth of the child is likely to give the parent more
effective ability to control the actions of the child and to make it more often necessary to
exercise it." 26 Conn. Supp. at 355, 223 A.2d at 404.
example, when the family is separated, only the parent who exercises
physical custody and control can be determined to be responsible for the
child's actions. 63
The issue of parental control is usually clear and seldom presents
much of an obstacle to the injured plaintiff. The same cannot be said of
the second hurdle imposed by the Restatement, the parent's knowledge of
the necessity and opportunity to exercise his control. This hurdle is
composed of two factors. The first is that the parent must know that a
danger exists. Thus, when a mother did not know that her nine-year-old
had obtained a slingshot she could not be held responsible for the injury
he caused to a young playmate's eye. 64 The second element, the parent's
knowledge of his child's propensity to harm others, 6 is even more
difficult to prove. A sampling of some of the cases on this point demon-
strates the difficulty a plaintiff will likely encounter. 66 The courts seem to
63. In Mazzilli v. Selger, 13 N.J. 296, 99 A.2d 417 (1953), the court decided that the
father was not responsible for controlling his son even though his separate domicile was on
the same three-acre tract as that of his ex-wife, with whom the boy lived. Contra, Repko v.
Serianni, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 374, 214 A.2d 843 (1965), holding the father liable even though his
son was technically in state custody and had run away from home, where he had been sent
on an experimental basis.
64. Hatch v. O'Neill, 133 Ga. App. 624, 212 S.E.2d 11 (1974).
65. Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1963).
66. An excellent illustration is provided by the recent case of Parsons v. Smithey, 109
Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973). Fourteen-year-old Michael Smithey entered Mrs. Parsons'
home and began beating her with a hammer. When questioned about his motive, Michael
replied that she should take her clothes off and lie down on the floor. Mrs. Parsons' two
daughters arrived and tried to help their mother. When one attempted to leave and call the
police, Michael beat her with the hammer. He also used a knife and a belt buckle in his
attack, almost severing Mrs. Parsons' ear. He then departed in return for a small sum of
money but threatened all three women with death if they notified the police. This was not
Michael's first indiscretion. His parents were aware of the following acts: Michael had
thrown rocks at a strange woman on the street when she refused his order to take off her
clothes; his teacher had to move him because he punched and poked the other students; and
he once followed a classmate home, forced his way into her home, and shoved her around.
His counsellors had recommended psychiatric treatment. Yet this is not the total picture.
Michael's police record included apprehension for arson at ages eight and eleven, for
running away from home at nine, for stealing his father's watch at ten and three times for
joyriding at age fourteen. Despite these warnings, the court ruled that Michael's parents
could not foresee that he had the propensity to commit such a violent act on Mrs. Parsons.
They put it succinctly: "In this case it appears that the evidence of Michael's past behavior
would not have led a reasonable parent to conclude that Michael could commit such a
violent and vicious act." Id. at 54, 504 P.2d at 1277. This case has received further notation:
Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 964 (1973). Certainly the Parsons case casts doubt on an injured
party's ability realistically to expect recovery from the minor tortfeasor's parent. The case
is more the rule than the exception.
In Dunaway v. Kaylor, 127 Ga. App. 586, 194 S.E.2d 264 (1972), a fourteen-year-old
stabbed his neighbor with an icepick. The plaintiff was unable to prove parental knowledge
of a propensity for violence even though the parent had previously admitted that his son was
troublesome. The court said, "Merely admitting that he knew he would have 'problems'
could not be a reasonable basis for inference of previous knowledge of violent traits." Id. at
587, 194 S.E.2d at 265.
A Missouri case offers a hint on what the courts require before they will recognize
parental knowledge of a child's tortious propensity. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Freschi,
393 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). Here, a three-year-old wandered away from home as he
had done before. On this occasion he started a lawfully parked milk truck, which caused a
collision and $500 damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of
action against the boy's parents. They wrote,
be looking for some form of habitually improper behavior that the child
has previously exhibited to his parent67-a matter that is often difficult to
prove. The court in Linder v. Bidner68 presented a concise statement of
the rule:
69
The rule would seem to be that a parent is negligent when
there has been a failure to adopt reasonable measures to pre-
vent a definite type of harmful conduct on the part of the child,
but that there is no liability on the part of the parents for the
general incorrigibility of a child.
Thus proof of parental knowledge of the child's habitually anti-
social behavior is necessary to recovery. The establishment of that knowl-
edge will not, however, guarantee satisfaction to the plaintiff. For inst-
ance, if a parent is aware of his child's propensity for wrongdoing but
takes a proper course of action, such as chastisement, any claim of lax
parental supervision is negated. This was the result in Horton v.
Reaves.7 ° Here, the mother of an infant that was dropped off a bed
brought an action against the mother of the young neighbor boys who did
it. Mrs. Reaves testified that Mrs. Horton had previously reprimanded her
sons for pushing another Horton child off a bed. The court rejected this
argument remarking, "This latter testimony indicates that Mrs. Horton
exercised due care in watching over Johnny and Keith." 7 1 The court's
decision in Horton was just, because the parent had acted reasonably in
terms of supervising her children. It is more difficult to accept the New
Jersey decision of Zuckerbrod v. Burch. 72 In Zuckerbrod the mother was
aware of her child's tendency to throw rocks and sticks at other children.
One day, while playing "knights-in-armor," he injured a playmate by
throwing a metal rod that was serving as a sword. Several witnesses,
including his mother, testified as to Harvey's dangerous habit of re-
peatedly throwing objects at other children. Nevertheless, the court ex-
cused the child's mother from all liability because she had warned and
punished Harvey, and the problem was not considered drastic enough to
require either confinement or constant supervision.' This case is harsher
If plaintiffs are unable to prove that said minor child had climbed into and started
automobiles or trucks before, they certainly cannot prove that the parents of said
minor child failed and refused to restrain the said minor child in that propensity.
d. at 55.
67. This point was brought out in Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955),
discussed earlier. See notes 25-26 supra. After reviewing several cases along similar lines,
the Florida Supreme Court wrote, "One common factor from the foregoing cases appears
salient in the assessment of liability to the parents, that the child had the habit of doing the
particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury complained of." Id. at 705
(emphasis added). Like the owner of a dog, a parent appears to be entitled to one worry. The
Smithey case indicates that the parent is entitled to many worries if they are dissimilar. See
note 66 supra.
68. 50 Misc. 2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
69. Id. at 323, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
70. 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974).
71. Id. at 154, 526 P.2d at 307.
72. 88 N.J. Super. 1, 210 A.2d 425 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965).
73. Id. at 6, 210 A.2d at 427.
to the plaintiff than Horton because it suggests that ineffective supervi-
sion is not sufficient to open recovery to the injured plaintiff. Obviously
this erects one more obstacle in the injured party's path. He must not only
prove that the parent was aware of his child's dangerous habit but also
that the situation could have been ameliorated by proper parental
supervision.
With regard to the child as actor, the main point to be stressed is how
thoroughly both the offending child and his parent are insulated from
liability. This applies with equal force to both intentional and negligent
torts. The few exceptions the courts have carved out of the common-law
rule of parental non-liability are often strictly construed and do not stray
far from the common law. The statutory approach generally finds parental
liability more readily, but usually this liability is limited. Vandalism
statutes, while beneficial, certainly cannot be characterized as a gold
mine for the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is able to overcome the many
obstacles that confront him, his best source of recovery continues to be a
parent who is guilty of negligent supervision. At the present time, the
courts protect the parent-child relationship at the expense of the injured
party by effectively absolving the parent from responsibility for his
child's tort. This notion of protecting the parent-child relationship is also
an important rationale behind the doctrine of parent-child immunity.
IV. Parent-Child Immunity
Parent-child immunity consists of the child's disability to sue his
parent for wrongs the parent has inflicted upon the child. 74 It is an
expansive subject that has inspired a great deal of comment. 75 The
doctrine did not exist at common law but was first devised in Mississippi
in 1891.76 Despite its novelty, parent-child immunity was rapidly em-
braced throughout the country. This was even accomplished emotionally
as one court looked beyond the common law to find its origins in the
tablets handed down atop Mount Sinai."7 This point of view notwith-
standing, three rationales are commonly cited as supportive. One is a
74. Comment, Parental Immunity: Mississippi's Gift to the American Family, 7 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 597 (1971).
75. See, e.g., Comment, Parental Immunity: California's Answer, 8 IDAHO L. REV.
179 (1971); Comment, Torts-Parent and Child Immunity-Suit Against Parent's Estate, 59
KY. L.J. 205 (1970); Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27
U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 (1972); Comment, Parental-Immunity: Mississippi's Gift to the
American Family, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 597 (1971); Comment, Parental Immunity and
Respondeat Superior, 1970, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 242 (1971).
76. In Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), the court refused to allow
a married minor living at home to recover from her mother for her unjustified commitment
to an asylum. The court wrote,
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of
society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
77. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 585-86, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923).
broad public policy that regards the family as the primary unit of govern-
ment, analogizing the father as head of the family to a sovereign. The
second, an offshoot of the first, is to protect the family unit from the
disruption that litigation would bring. The third is the danger of fraud and
collusion between family members to dupe the insurance company.
78
Another ground for support less frequently advanced is that without the
doctrine the parental privilege of employing physical force in disciplinary
matters would be undermined.
79
Despite these rationales and the fervent support immunity sometimes
engendered, exceptions to it were carved out. An emancipated minor
could maintain an action against his parent, presumably because the
purposes of the immunity doctrine did not forcefully apply.80 Nor did
immunity apply to intentional torts.81 Some jurisdictions even permitted
an action to be maintained when the relationship at the time of the
accident was business- rather than family-oriented. 82 These exceptions to
the doctrine of parental immunity were harbingers of the general erosion
of the doctrine that has accelerated recently.
An early New Hampshire case held that the doctrine did not apply
because of the presence of insurance in that particular case. 83 Later, the
prevalence of insurance coverage in society led toward the total abroga-
tion of parent-child immunity in New Hampshire.84 The national trend
toward complete abrogation of the doctrine began in 1963 with the
78. Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 191 (1972).
79. Id. at 196.
80. Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955). In Weinberg v.
Underwood, 101 N.J. Super. 448, 244 A.2d 538 (Essex County Ct. 1968), the court declared
that once emancipation occurs, the state has no strong interest in maintaining a harmonious
family unit: "[T]his Court declines to extend immunity from tort liability actions between
parents and emancipated children." Id. at 451, 244 A.2d at 540.
81. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
82. In Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963), plaintiff was
sleeping nearby while his father engaged in a tree felling business. It was alleged that the
father had negligently allowed a felled tree to be dragged across the child. After reviewing
the common rationales supporting the doctrine of immunity and several cases from sister
states, the court ruled the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiff's case for failure to
state a cause of action. "Under the circumstances alleged here we find no sufficient reason
for denying to the child the remedy sought." Id. at 423, 378 P.2d at 643.
Contra, Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968). Here, a six-year-old
who accompanied his father to the cafe he owned had no cause of action against the parent
when he mangled his hand in the meat grinder. The court emphasized the personal nature of
the parent-child relationship even though at the time of the accident the family was engaged
in a commercial pursuit.
83. In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930), the court said that the
immunity doctrine should not apply when an insurance company is the real party in interest.
"It does not apply . . . to a case where liability in fact has been transferred to a third
party." Id. at 372, 150 A. at 915.
84. New Hampshire finally abrogated the doctrine of immunity completely in Briere
v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966). The court wrote, "[A]s a practical matter, the
prevalence of insurance cannot be ignored in determining whether a court should continue
to discriminate against a class of individuals by depriving them of a right enjoyed by all other
individuals," Id. at 435, 224 A.2d at 590.
Wisconsin case of Goller v. White. 8 5 Goller let stand two situations in
which immunity would still be recognized: (1) when the negligent act
involved an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) when
parental discretion with respect to providing the child with necessaries is
present.8 6 Since Goller the trend has been to abolish parental immunity
completely. Over ten states have done so, including Pennsylvania,8 7 New
York88 and California.89 It would be fair to speculate that its days are
numbered in other states as well.9° This trend, which expands the rights
of a child who has suffered an injury, is an indication of the favorable
treatment a child receives when he is the victim of the offense. It is
unfortunate that the victim of a child's tort is not currently benefitted by
an equivalent degree of judicial protection.
V. The Child as Victim
When the child is the victim of a tort inflicted by one other than his
parent, there is, of course, no parental immunity bar to bringing a cause
of action. Thus, the cases in this area, and the rules the courts have
developed, provide further illustration of the unique treatment children
receive in court.
Whenever a child is the victim of a tort, two causes of action arise.
One is in behalf of the child and the other belongs to his parent. Each of
them is entitled to recover specifically designated damages that are not
available to the other.9 1 The child is permitted to recover for the pain and
suffering his physical injury causes him to endure. 92 While the child is
also entitled to recover earnings that because of reduced capacity will be
lost after he reaches majority, 93 any loss of earnings during his minority is
recoverable by his parent.94 The medical expenses incurred normally
85. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
86. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
87. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
88. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
89. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
90. In Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968), the court
appraised the current status of the parent-child immunity doctrine: "[Firom the time,
however, of its general acceptance in this country, it has undergone a general erosion like
the all-day sucker in the hands of a small child until there isn't much left but the stick itself."
Id. at 204, 241 N.E.2d at 14.
91. Botelho v. Curtis, 28 Conn. Supp. 493, 267 A.2d 675 (Super. Ct. 1970); Orr v. Orr,
36 N.J. 236, 176 A.2d 241 (1961).
92. Schmidt v. Kratzer, 402 Pa. 630, 168 A.2d 585 (1961).
93. In Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965), the court described the
action that arises in behalf of the child as "aln action on behalf of the child to recover
damages for pain and suffering, permanent injury and impairment of earning capacity after
attaining majority . Id. at 306, 144 S.E.2d at 29. See Schmidt v. Kratzer, 402 Pa. 630,
168 A.2d 585 (1961).
94. The court in Smith v. Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 70 S.E.2d 825 (1952), wrote,
The general rule is that an unemancipated minor cannot recover as an ele-
ment of damage in an action for personal injury for loss of earnings or diminished
earning capacity during his minority, but that the father is primarily entitled to his
• * ' earnings as long as the minor is legally in his custody or under his control.
Id. at 617, 70 S.E.2d at 827.
belong to the parent's cause of action since he is legally responsible for
them as an element of his duty to support an unemancipated minor.
95
There are four recognized situations, however, in which the child may
recover the medical expenses for himself: (1) when the minor has paid
them himself; (2) when the minor is responsible for them because of
emancipation or parental incompetence; (3) when the parent has waived
any consequential damages in favor of the child; or (4) when the child is
permitted to recover them by statute.
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Although this represents the major division of damages between the
parent's and the child's causes of action, other types of damages may be
recoverable in a particular state. Often, the parent is entitled to recover
damages for the loss of the child's services or companionship. 97 Some
states even permit the parent to recover for the mental distress he suffers
if the injury to his child was willful or malicious. 98
There are other variations, more procedural in nature, in which the
proper course of action will depend solely upon the forum concerned. For
example, some states, such as Virginia, hold that the parent's cause of
action is a derviative one that is dependent upon the validity of the child's
cause of action. 99 Other states take an opposite view. 100 Another situation
subject to jurisdictional differences occurs when the parent brings suit in
behalf of the child against the tortfeasor. Some courts hold that the
95. Faber v. Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 212 N.W.2d 856 (1973); Peer v. City of Newark,
71 N.J. Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); Schmidt v. Kratzer, 402 Pa.
630, 168 A.2d 585 (1961).
96. Moses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 132, 122 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1961).
97. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 N.J. Super. 84, 238 A.2d 512 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968);
Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967). In Leahy v. Morgan, 275
F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Iowa 1967), the court was confronted with a situation in which the Iowa
courts had taken no definite position on whether loss of companionship was recoverable by
the parent. Following what it believed to be the newer position, the court said, "There
appears to be no clear Iowa stand on the issue of whether a parent may recover for loss of
the society, companionship and affection of a minor child. . . . As a result, the court is not
moved at this time to dismiss this claim from the plaintiffs' cause of action." Id. at 426. See
Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950).
98. Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195, 151 A.2d 690 (1959). The court wrote,
"It is generally held that a parent is not entitled to recover for mental distress and anxiety on
account of an injury to his child unless the injury is a willful or malicious one." Id. at 198,
151 A.2d at 692.
99. In Norfolk S. Ry. v. Fincham, 213 Va. 122, 189 S.E.2d 380 (1972), nine-year-old
Danny Fincham's right leg was crushed by a railroad car and had to be amputated below the
knee. Danny's father brought an action for the medical expenses he incurred, together with
an action in Danny's behalf. Although the jury awarded the parent recovery for the medical
expenses, the court reversed pending the return of a final verdict in Danny's case. It stated,
The father's cause of action for medical and incidental expenses was a
derivative action. The trial court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict
for Danny before his father was entitled to recover. Since there was no verdict in
Danny's case there could be none in the father's case.
Id. at 128, 189 S.E.2d at 384.
100. In Maccia v. Tynes, 39 N.J. Super. 1, 120 A.2d 263 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956),
the court said, "The right to such services and to reimbursement for such expenses is not
derivative, but independent and separate from his child's rights." Id. at 13, 120 A.2d at 269.
Accord, Meisel v. Meisel, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962).
undertaking constitutes a waiver by the parent of his own cause of action
for consequential damages. 0I Other courts hold that it is not a waiver. 102
Still another split exists on whether the contributory negligence of one
parent will serve as a bar to the other parent's recovery. Again, some
states answer the question affirmatively, 10 3 while others say no. 0 4 These
divisions leave the practitioner little recourse but to examine the rules of
the particular jurisdiction in which he is confronted by the problem.
The final matter to analyze is the effect negligent parental super-
vision will have on the chances of recovery of both parent and child. 105
Today, parental negligence contributing to the injury of the child gener-
ally will not be imputed to that child.106 This has not always been the
rule. At one time many states would impute a parent's negligence to his
child and deny recovery.I 7 Naturally this often produced harsh results for
101. In Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965), the court remarked,
[W]here a father prosecutes an action on behalf of his minor child and seeks to
recover therein the damages which the father himself otherwise would be entitled
to recover in his own separate action therefor, and no objection is interposed by
the defendant, the father thereby waives his individual rights against the
defendant.
Id. at 307, 144 S.E.2d at 30 (emphasis in original).
102. Wales v. Howard, 164 Colo. 167, 433 P.2d 493 (1967).
103. The court in Price v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 161 S.E.2d 590(1968),
disallowed the father's attempt to recover medical expenses incurred in the treatment of his
two daughters after their mother's negligent driving caused them to be hit by a train. It
wrote,
[W]e have ruled that Bertha Price's legal contributory negligence was attributable
to her husband, Brooks M. Price, and bars any recovery by him for the demolition
of his automobile. In principle we can see no difference in Brooks M. Price's
action to recover damages for the demolition of his automobile and his action to
recover medical expenses incurred in the necessary treatment of his two minor,
unemancipated children injured in the collision, and we hold that his action to
recover such medical expenses incurred in the treatment of the injuries of his two
minor, unemancipated daughters is barred.
Id. at 43, 161 S.E.2d at 598.
104. See, e.g., Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Idzojtic v. Catalucci, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 292 A.2d 464 (1972);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 494-A (1965).
105. The initial point to remember is that negligent parental supervision consists of a
violation of the parent's duty to control his child as expressed by the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). See notes 60-73 and accompanying text supra. The
determination must be made on an individual case basis since mere unattendance of the
child is not necessarily improper supervision. The court in Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71
Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1972), said, "[Niegligence of the parents in
permitting a child in the street depends, amongst other things, on the age and intelligence of
the child and the surrounding facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at 476, 336
N.Y.S.2d at 303.
106. In City & County of Denver v. Kennedy, 476 P.2d 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970), a
five-year-old child was permitted to recover even though her parents may have been
negligent in allowing her to get too close to the zebra cage at the zoo. The court wrote,
"Because of her age at the time of injury, Denise, as a matter of law, could not have been
guilty of contributory negligence. Nor is any possible negligence on the part of her parents
imputable to Denise." Id. at 763.
107. Maryland is a good case in point. It originally imputed the parent's negligence to
the child even though this denied recovery to a blameless child. Thus in Graham v. Western
Md. Dairy, 198 Md. 210, 81 A.2d 457 (1951), a three-year-old was denied recovery for his
injury because his mother was negligent in allowing him to play in an alley she knew was
frequented by milk trucks. The imputation of parental negligence, which often resulted in an
uncompensated, although innocent, child was subsequently abolished by statute in 1957.
Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444, 190 A.2d 773 (1963).
which the child was in no way responsible. Thus this severe approach,
termed the New York Rule, 108 generally has been abolished. Neverthe-
less, it still may prevent a child from recovering for an injury in some
jurisdictions. 109
A recent development that may adversely affect the negligent parent
occurred in Sorrentino v. United States. 110 The driver of a Department of
Agriculture vehicle negligently struck the young plaintiff, who was riding
his bicycle in the street. The government moved to amend its answer to
include a counterclaim against the boy's parents as joint tortfeasors
because of their negligent supervision. The court realized that granting
this motion could create a situation in which the parent played three roles.
He could simultaneously be an individual plaintiff, a third-party defend-
ant and a guardian ad litem for the infant plaintiff. It also would indirectly
make the parent liable to his child for negligent supervision if the
defendant won his counterclaim, because the award would go from the
parent's pocket through the joint tortfeasor to the child. Nevertheless, the
court granted the motion despite the complexities it created.
It cannot yet be determined whether this holding represents a trend.
In New York, Sorrentino has often been distinguished on its facts."1 The
only other state that currently permits this form of contribution is Hawaii,
which allows even direct suit against the parent by his child."
2
108. Howe v. Central Vt. Ry., 91 Vt. 485, 493, 101 A. 45, 48 (1917). The rule has since
been abolished in New York. Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Auth., 72 Misc. 2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The Collazo court wrote,
The negligence of the parent may not be imputed to the infant . . . although the
failure of the parent to act reasonably in the care and supervision of the infant
immediately prior to an accident may amount to contributory negligence barring a
derivative recovery by the parent.
Id. at 948, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (citations omitted).
109. In Orr v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 280 A.2d 785 (Me. 1971), eight-year-old Rosselyn
Orr was injured while swinging on the steel railing of a supermarket's doors. When Rosselyn
brought action against the store, the defendant alleged that her mother's negligent supervi-
sion was a contributing factor. Recognizing that the negligence question was for the jury and
that parental negligence, if found, would be imputed to the child, the court declared,
Likewise correct were the court's rulings that the comparative causational
negligence, if any, of the plaintiff, Rosselyn Orr, and of her mother-imputable to
Rosselyn under Maine law even though Rosselyn might have been old enough to
exercise some degree of care for her own safety . . .- were questions appro-
priate for jury decision.
Id. at 796 (citations omitted). Negligent parental supervision may affect the parent's recov-
ery as well. In one case in which a negligent driver struck and injured a young child, both the
child and the parent recovered at trial. Because the jury had also found negligent parental
supervision of young Jeffrey in allowing him to stray from the beach onto the road, the
parent's recovery was reversed on appeal. The court concluded that since parental negli-
gence had been a proximate cause of the injury, the father was not entitled to recover any
damages. Berner v. Yarborough, 456 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
110. 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
111. See, e.g., Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 475-76, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301,
302-03 (Sup. Ct. 1972). "In Sorrentino, however, the court was quick to point out that its
holding was limited . . and was not to imply a sanctioning of direct suit by a child against
his parent." Ryan v. Fahey, 43 App. Div. 2d 429, -, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288 (1974).
112. In Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970), a
child was burned by the hot ashes of a barbecue pit. The trial court struck the municipality's
counterclaim alleging negligence on the part of the parent. The Supreme Court reversed
In summary, an injury to a child gives rise to causes of action in
favor of both the child and his parent. Although the procedure to follow in
seeking recovery may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the child's
welfare is of primary importance. The courts seek to provide him with
redress, even in states that allow the tortfeasor to seek contribution from
the parent for negligent supervision. This illustrates the great degree of
compassion the courts feel for the child as victim of a tortious act.
VI. Conclusion
A child who becomes the victim of a tortious act is well protected by
the law. He is entitled to recover damages for his injuries in almost every
case regardless of whether improper parental supervision played a con-
tributory role. Even those few courts that do allow contribution from the
negligent parent do not hinder the child's recovery. Moreover, because of
his age, the child commonly will be deemed incapable of contributory
negligence that ordinarily would bar his recovery. Since the child is often
either blame-free or too immature to appreciate the danger of his actions,
this is the more prudent course. Whether he is the parent or a third party,
the adult should be encouraged to be alert for the child's welfare and
safety. In an age of ubiquitous insurance, it is foolish to deny a child
recompense for an injury suffered at the hand of an insufficiently alert
adult even if the child was improperly supervised.
The strong protection the courts afford the parent of a child who has
committed a tortious act is not justified. The exceptions carved out of the
common-law rule of parental non-liability have done little to aid the
plaintiff's quest for compensation. The obstacles encountered by the
plaintiff include not only questions of the child's capacity but also the
requirement of proving parental knowledge of the child's offensive habit.
Even then recovery may be denied if the parent's conduct in terms of
supervision has been reasonable.
Although it is frequently declared that the parent is not the insurer of
the child, placing the parent under the burden of serving as the child's
insurer would be the better approach. The parent is in a position to
appreciate the risk his child presents and to protect against the potential
consequences. Just as immunity between parent and child has fallen
because of the prevalence of insurance, so too should the protection the
parent and child enjoy at an injured plaintiff's expense. The time has
come to remove the unfair obstacles that effectively bar the victim of a
child's tort from compensation by the parent.
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saying, "We therefore hold that the child can enforce liability against his parents, and that
the counterclaim against the parents should have been allowed." Id. at 486, 462 P.2d at
1008.

